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Abstract 
 
This paper studies social welfare in a heterogeneous population under the criteria of 
efficiency and sustainable heterogeneity. As is well known, heterogeneity in time 
preference results in substantial inequality. This paper shows that, even if households 
have heterogeneous preferences, there is a balanced growth path on which all the 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are equally and indefinitely 
satisfied, and heterogeneity is sustainable on this path. The existence of a unique 
sustainable path will shed new light on social welfare issues, but this path cannot 
necessarily be naturally obtained by relying only on markets. Sustainable heterogeneity 
is politically fragile and requires rational―not unconditional―sacrifice and altruism, 
and interventions by the authority are justified. Sustainable heterogeneity indicates that 
globalization should be accompanied by measures that support developing countries and 
that a GDP modified for measures of sustainable heterogeneity may more correctly 
measure people’s “happiness.” However, it also indicates that inequality is necessary for 
sustainability and a unique sustainable level of inequality exists. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Becker (1980) showed that, if time preference is heterogeneous, the most 
patient household will eventually own all capital and substantial inequality will emerge. 
Hence, heterogeneity in preferences is an important subject for social welfare. The state 
Becker (1980) showed is Pareto efficient, but less patient households cannot achieve 
optimality. Consequently, even though the state is Pareto efficient, it may not be 
practically sustainable because the less patient households will try to escape from the 
non-optimality by various means—particularly political ones. Therefore, both efficiency 
and sustainability should be considered in the study of a heterogeneous population. The 
term “sustainability” is often used narrowly in reference to environmental problems, but 
here it is used in an economic sense. It contains a normative ingredient and therefore is 
closely related to welfare economics—particularly the social welfare function (e.g., 
Samuelson, 1947; Arrow, 1962; Sen, 1973). However, the relationship between 
sustainability and social welfare is little known because most studies on social welfare 
have not focused on heterogeneity in the process of economic growth. This paper directs 
its attention to heterogeneity in endogenous growth and studies social welfare in a 
heterogeneous population under the dual criteria of efficiency and sustainability. 
 The state described by Becker (1980) implies that substantial inequality is an 
inevitable consequence of pursuing efficiency in a heterogeneous population. In other 
words, inequality is positively correlated with economic growth. The correlation 
between inequality and growth has long been studied (e.g., Kuznets 1955). Some 
empirical studies have shown that inequality is negatively correlated with growth (e.g., 
Alesina und Rodrik, 1994; Persson und Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and 
Squire, 1998), but some recent studies show positive correlations, particularly in 
industrialized economies (e.g., Forbes, 2000; Barro, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005). In this 
paper, the correlation in a heterogeneous population is examined by considering 
sustainability in endogenous growth models. 
 This paper deals with three heterogeneities—those in time preference, risk 
aversion, and productivity—and examines their sustainability in endogenous growth 
models. These three parameters are essential elements for endogenous growth. 
Sustainable heterogeneity is defined as the state in which all heterogeneous households 
indefinitely maintain their optimality. The models indicate that a balanced growth path 
exists on which all heterogeneous households indefinitely hold optimality and 
heterogeneity is sustainable. However, a unilaterally balanced growth path also exists 
on which only the most advantaged household can achieve optimality. The unilateral 
path is not sustainable and will cause political conflicts through the resistance of less 
advantaged households. Although advantaged households can achieve optimality on 
either path, less advantaged households can achieve optimality only on the multilateral 
path. This characteristic dramatically changes the behavior of advantaged households, 
because conflict between households can end with all households commonly achieving 
optimality if advantaged households select the multilateral path. In this paper, path 
selection―whether multilateral or unilateral―is modeled by introducing a political loss 
function. If less advantaged households unite firmly and the authority utilizes various 
measures (e.g., progressive taxes, financial transfers, and affirmative action), the 
multilateral path can be secured.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, multi-economy endogenous 
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growth models with heterogeneous rates of time preference, degrees of risk aversion, 
and productivities are constructed. In Section 3, sustainability of heterogeneity is 
examined by using the models. The existence of a unique balanced growth path on 
which all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied is shown, 
and heterogeneity on this path is sustainable. In Section 4, the unilaterally balanced 
growth path is examined on which only the most advantaged household can achieve 
optimality, and heterogeneity is not sustainable. In Section 5, the political mechanism of 
the path selection is examined. Section 6 shows the means to establish sustainable 
heterogeneity. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
2.1  The base model 
 In this paper, sustainability of heterogeneity is examined in the framework of 
endogenous growth, but most endogenous growth models commonly have problems 
with scale effects or the influence of population growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, 
this paper uses the model presented by Harashima (2004), which is free from both 
problems (see also Jones, 1995a; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 
2002). The production function is ( )tttt LKAFY ,,= , and the accumulation of capital is 
 
tttt AνCYK && −−=  ,                            (1) 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is 
consumption, ( )0>ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1  of a unit of At are 
equivalent: that is, they are produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are 
identical and have the same size, and for any period, 
 
t
ρ
t
L
Mm =  ,                            (2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms and m and ( )1>ρ  are constants. In addition,  
 
( )ttρttt νA
YM
K
Y
∂
∂=∂
∂ −  ;                       (3) 
 
thus,  
 
( )
t
t
t
t
A
ym ν
k
y
∂
∂=∂
∂ −1                          (4) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita and kt is capital per capita. Equation (2) 
indicates that population and number of firms are positively correlated. Equations (3) 
and (4) indicate that returns on investing in Kt and in At are kept equal and that a firm 
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that produces a new technology cannot obtain all the returns on an investment in At. 
This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the investing firm’s return on the 
investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
( ) ( ) ( )tttttρt νA
YmL
νA
YM ∂
∂=∂
∂ −− 1  because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to 
other firms. 
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; 
Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers 
(i.e., Jacobs externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge 
spillovers between homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will 
therefore primarily emerge within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers will be more active if the number of firms within a sector is larger. On the 
other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that knowledge spillovers are most effective among 
firms that practice different activities and that diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is 
important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more 
active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. Nevertheless, if all sectors have 
the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in the economy results in 
more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR externalities or 
Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the amount of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases,   
the investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  indicates the total 
increase in Yt in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both 
outputs in the firm that invented the new technology and outputs in other firms that use 
the newly invented technology, whether the firms obtained the technology by 
compensating the originating firm or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If 
the number of firms becomes larger and uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur 
more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  that the investing firm can obtain 
becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the investment in At also become 
smaller. Equations (3) and (4) describe this mechanism. 
 The production function is specified as ( )ttαtt ,LKfAY =  where α ( )10 << α  is 
a constant. Let 
t
t
t L
Yy = , 
t
t
t L
Kk = , 
t
t
t L
Cc = , and 
t
t
t L
Ln
&= , and assume that ( )tt LKf ,  is 
homogenous of degree one. Thus ( )tαtt kfAy =  and tt
t
t
ttt knL
Aν
cyk −−−=
&& . By equation 
(4), ( )( )t
t
t kfmν
kαfA ′=  because ( ) ( )tαttαtt
t
t
t kfAkfA
mν
α
k
y
Amν
y ′=⇔∂
∂=∂
∂ −1 . 
 
2.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
 Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and 
productivity―are examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions 
of the model shown in Section 2.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― 
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economy 1 and economy 2—that are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
or productivity. The population growth rate is zero (i.e., 0=tn ). The economies are 
fully open to each other, and goods, services, and capital are freely transacted between 
them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the 
international interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national 
interpretation). Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade 
and form a combined economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the 
international interpretation and the national economy in the national interpretation. In 
the following discussion, a model based on the international interpretation is called an 
international model and that based on the national interpretation is called a national 
model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used only for the international 
transactions. However, because both national and international interpretations are 
possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models in this 
paper. 
 
2.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time 
preference is constructed.1 The rate of time preference of the representative household 
in economy 1 is 1θ  and that in economy 2 is 2θ , and 21 θθ < . The production function 
in economy 1 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,1,1 =  and that in economy 2 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,2,2 = , where yi,t 
and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 
2. The population of each economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is 
sufficiently large. Firms operate in both economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The 
current account balance in economy 1 is tτ  and that in economy 2 is tτ− . Because a 
balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological progress, the production 
functions are further specified as  
 
 αti,αti,t kAy −= 1  ; 
 
thus, ( ) ( )2,11,, == − iLAKY αttαtiti . 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each 
economy are kept equal through arbitration such that  
 
=∂
∂
,t
,t
k
y
1
1 ( ) ( )
,t
,t
t
,t,t
k
y
A
yy
mν
2
22112 ∂
∂=∂
+∂− .                  (5) 
 
Equation (5) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such 
that ( )( )t
,t,tρ
t
i,t
i,t
νA
YY
M
K
Y
∂
+∂=∂
∂ − 21 , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), =∂
∂
i,t
i,t
K
Y  
                                                          
1 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous time preference was originally shown by 
Harashima (2009c). 
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
t
,t,tt
t
,t,t
t
t
,t,tρ
t
i,t
i,t
A
yy
mvL
νA
yy
mL
νA
YY
M
k
y
∂
+∂=∂
+∂=∂
+∂=∂
∂ −−− 21121121 2
2
. Therefore, 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )t ttt ttt kfmν
kfkfα
kfmν
kfkfα
A
,2
,2,1
,1
,2,1
22 ′
+=′
+=  . 
 
Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kk ,2,1 = , tt kk ,2,1 && = , 
tt yy ,2,1 =  and tt yy ,2,1 && =  are also held. Hence, 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )ttttt kfm ν
kαf
kfm ν
kαf
A
,2
,2
,1
,1
′=′=  . 
 
In addition, because ( ) ( )
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21
∂
+∂=∂
+∂  through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1 && =  
is held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s∫0  mirrors capital flows between 
the two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the 
other economy. Since ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂
t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t ∫∂∂ 0,1,1  and 
dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t ∫∂∂ 0,2,2  represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns 
in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t ∫∂∂− 0,2,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t τdsτ
k
y −∂
∂ ∫0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between 
the economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
 ( ),t,tt ,kkgτ 21=  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuE t 10 ,11 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
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1
,1,10
,2
,2
,1,1 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  ,           (6) 
 
and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuE t 20 ,22 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
1
,2,20
,1
,1
,2,2 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−+∂
∂−= ∫ ttttt s
t
t
tt
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  ,             (7) 
 
where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,& , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and 
the increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the 
expectation operator; and ttt AAA ,2,1 &&& += . Equations (6) and (7) implicitly assume that 
each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because ( )( )ttt kfmν
kαf
A
,1
,1
′=  
( )( )ttkfmν
kαf
,2
,2
′=  and 
α
i,tkf
−= 1 , then 
 
( ) ti,t kαmν
αA −= 1  
 
and 
 
 ( ) αα
ti,
ti, α
mν
α
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂ 11  . 
 
Since ,t,t AA 21 && =  and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , then 
 
      
1
10
,1
,1
11 22
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ tt,ttt s
t
t
,t,t
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk
&&  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,tt,tt
t
s
α
α
t
α
α
k
αmL
αcτdsτα
mν
αkα
mv
α
110
1
,1 1
11 &−−−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−  
 
and 
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+−
−= ∫−− ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
t
t
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
α
ααmL
αmLk 10
1
11 111
1&  . 
 
Because tL  is sufficiently large, the problem of scale effects vanishes and thereby ( )
( ) 11
1 =+−
−
ααmL
αmL
t
t .  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 
can be rewritten as  
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuEMax ,t 10 11 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 10
1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  . 
 
Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
 
 ( ) ( )dttθcuEMax ,t 20 22 exp −∫ ∞  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 20
1
22 11 −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  . 
 
2.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same 
as that of heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in 
regard to risk aversion. 2  The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε ,t
1
11
1 −=  and that of economy 2 is 'u
"uc
ε ,t
2
22
2 −= , which are constant, and 21 εε < . 
The optimization problem of economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 11  , 
 
subject to 
 
                                                          
2 This type of endogenous growth model of heterogeneous risk aversion was originally shown by 
Harashima (2009d). 
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 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 10
1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  , 
 
and that of economy 2 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 22  , 
 
subject to 
 
 ( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
αkα
mν
αk 20
1
22 11 −+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  . 
 
2.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not 
the utility function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a 
heterogeneous production function requires heterogeneity in elements other than 
technology. Prescott (1998) argues that unknown factors other than technology have 
made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous across countries. Harashima (2009a) 
argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an essential element of 
productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. Since 
average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they can 
create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit 
all the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. 
Furthermore, innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient 
production. A production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been 
shown to have a Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% 
(Harashima 2009a), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
−= 1  ,                       (8) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ 
creative activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to 
capital with regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are 
dependent on the creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with 
technology At, these parameters can be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In 
addition, only productivity that is represented by αtLA Aωωσ  in equation (8) is 
heterogeneous between the two economies. The production function of economy 1 is ( ),tαtα,t kfAωy 111 =  and that of economy 2 is ( ),tαtα,t kfAωy 222 = , where ( )10 11 ≤< ωω  and 
( )10 22 ≤< ωω  are constants and 12 ωω < . Since ( )( )t ,t,tρtti, ti,ti,ti, νA
YY
M
k
y
K
Y
∂
+∂=∂
∂=∂
∂ − 21  
 9
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )t ,t,ttt ,t,tt A
yy
mvL
νA
yy
mL ∂
+∂=∂
+∂= −− 211211 2
2
 by equation (5), then 
 ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ),tα
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kfωmν
kfωkfωα
kfmνν
kfωkfωα
A
22
2211
11
2211
22 ′
+=′
+=  .        (9) 
 
Because equation (5) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kω
ωk ,2
2
1
,1 = , 
tt kω
ωk ,2
2
1
,1
&& = , tt yω
ωy ,2
2
1
,1 = , and tt yω
ωy ,2
2
1
,1 && =  are also held. In addition, since 
( ) ( )
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21
∂
+∂=∂
+∂  by arbitration, tt Aω
ωA ,2
2
1
,1
&& =  is held. Because of 
equation (9) and αti,αi kωf −= 1 , then ( ) ( )αααααt kkωkωωαm ν αA −+−= 121211112  
( ) ( )222111212 kωkkωωαm ν
α αααα
α +−=
− , 
α
αααα
α
αααα
ω
kωkkω
ω
kkωkω
2
222
1
11
1
1
21211 +=+
−−
, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ααααααααααααααα
ti
ti kkωkkωα
mν
αkkkωkωα
mν
α
k
y −−−−−− +−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂
2222
1
11
1
1
1
21211
1
,
, 1
2
1
2
α . 
Since tt kkω
ω
,2,1
1
2 = , then ( )2111
1
1
1
1
1
2
1211
1
1
21211 1 ωωk
ω
k
ω
ωkωkω
ω
kkωkω
α
α
α
ααα
α
αααα
−
−
−
−
+=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
=+  
and ( ) ( )121221111
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
21
1
21
11
2
222
1
11 11 −−
−
−
+=+=+=
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=+ ωωkωωkk
ω
ωk
ω
k
ω
ω
ωk
ω
ωkω
ω
kωkkω
α
αα
α
αα
α
αααα
. 
Hence,  
 
 =tA ( )( ) ( )( )αm ν ωωαkαm ν ωωαk −+=−+
−−
12
1
12
1 121
2
2
1
1
1  , 
 
and 
 
( ) ααα
ti,
ti, α
mν
αωω
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +=∂
∂ 121 1
2
 
 
for i = 1, 2. Because t
α
t Aω
ωA ,2
1
1
2
,1
&&
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  (i.e., ( ) t,t,t,t AωωAAA 121121 1 &&&& −+=+= ) and 
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
y
k
y
2
2
1
1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , then   
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1
110
1
1
11 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−∂
∂+= ∫ t,t,ttt s
,t
,t
,t,t
LAνcτdsτ
k
y
yk &&  
     ( ) 1121110
1
1
1 2
1
−
−− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−−−∂
∂+= ∫ tt,ttt s
,t
,t
,t
L
ωωAνcτdsτ
k
y
y &  
  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,tt,tt
t
s
α
α
,t
α
α k
αmL
αcτdsτα
mν
αωωk
αmv
αωω
ω 110
121
1
2
1
1
1 1
1
212
1 &
−−−−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+= ∫−−  , 
 
and 
 
 ( )( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
+
+−
−= ∫− ttt sα
α
t
α
t
t
t cτdsταmν
αωωk
αmv
αωω
ααmL
αmLk ,10
121
,1
21
,1 12121
1&  . 
 
 Because Lt is sufficiently large and ( )( ) 11
1 =+−
−
ααmL
αmL
t
t , the optimization problem 
of economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 11  , 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
 
 ( ) ( )dtθtcuEMax ,t −∫ ∞ exp0 22  , 
 
subject to 
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3.  SUSTAINABILITY OF HETEROGENEITY 
 
 Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of 
all heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. Although the previously 
discussed state of Becker (1980) is Pareto efficient, by this definition, the heterogeneity 
is not sustainable because only the most patient household can achieve optimality. 
Sustainability is therefore the stricter criterion for welfare than Pareto efficiency. 
 In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is 
 11
examined. First, the basic natures of the models presented in Section 2 are examined 
and then sustainability is examined. 
 
3.1  The consumption growth rate 
3.1.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−= ∫−− ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t,t cτdsταmν
αkα
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λtθcuH 10
1
111111 11exp  , 
 
where tλ 1  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 1 are 
 ( ) ( ) ,t
,t
,t λtθ
c
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1
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,t
,t k
H
λ
1
1
1 ∂
∂−=&  ,                         (11) 
( ) ( ) ,ttt sα
α
,t
α
α
,t cτdsταmν
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1
11 11 −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where tλ 2  is a costate variable. The optimality conditions for economy 2 are 
 ( ) ( ) ,t
,t
,t λtθ
c
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2
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,t
,t k
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∂−=&  ,                          (15) 
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−& , and       (16) 
0lim 22 =∞→ ,t,tt kλ  .                       (17) 
 
By equations (10), (11), and (12), the consumption growth rate in economy 1 is 
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and by equations (14), (15), and (16), that in economy 2 is 
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where 
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ε ,t,t
2
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1
11 −=−=  is the degree of relative risk aversion, which is constant. 
A constant growth rate such that 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
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is satisfied.  
 
3.1.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 By using similar procedures as were used with the heterogeneous time 
preference model, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
 
3.1.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 By similar procedures, the consumption growth rate in economy 1 in this 
model is 
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and that in economy 2 is 
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A constant growth rate such that 
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is satisfied.  
 
3.2  Transversality conditions 
3.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
 
Lemma 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, unless 1lim
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Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
3.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
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3.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 
Lemma 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, unless 1lim
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 In all three models, the occurrence of 1lim
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the following discussion. 
 
3.3  Sustainability 
 Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the 
following analyses focus on the steady state such that 
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3.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the 
following properties. 
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Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
Proposition 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
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Hence, by Lemma 1-1, the transversality conditions are satisfied while all the other 
optimality conditions are also satisfied. 
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Proof: See Appendix 3. 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
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Proof: By Lemma 2-1, 
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τ&&& . Therefore, by 
Corollary 1-1, equation (30) holds.                                        ■ 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, 
consumption, and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account 
balance to output, consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown 
in the proof of Proposition 1-1; that is, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim . 
 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 
2-1, heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the 
optimality conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced 
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growth path satisfying Proposition 1-1 and Corollaries 1-1 and 2-1 is called the 
“multilateral balanced growth path” or (more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the 
following discussion. The term “multilateral” is used even though there are only two 
economies, because the two-economy models shown can easily be extended to the 
multi-economy models shown in Section 3.6.  
 Because technology will not decrease persistently (i.e., 0lim >∞→
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Corollary 1-1) is examined in the following discussion. 
 
3.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same 
Proposition, Lemmas, and Corollaries are proved by arguments similar to those shown 
in Section 3.3.1. 
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Proposition 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if =∞→
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steady state. 
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Corollary 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if =∞→
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On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition 1-2 and Corollaries 1-2 and 2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the 
multilateral path. 
 
3.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 Similar Proposition, Lemmas, and Corollaries also hold in the heterogeneous 
productivity model. However, unlike heterogeneous preferences, 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 
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indicate. Therefore, the case of 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 0lim 0 =∫∞→ dsτt st  will be dealt with 
separately from the case of 0lim ≠∞→ tt τ  and 0lim 0 ≠∫∞→ dsτt st  if necessary. 
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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, 
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Proposition 1-3: If and only if == ∞→∞→
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&& constant, all the optimality conditions 
of both economies are satisfied at steady state. 
 
Corollary 1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if =∞→
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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition 1-3 and Corollaries 1-3 and 
2-3, heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 By equations (24) and (25), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable 
paths is 
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3.4  The balance of payments 
3.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 As shown in the proof of Proposition 1-1, Ξ
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ds &τ  on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign 
of Ξ is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent 
deficits and vice versa. 
 
Lemma 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
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Proof: See Appendix 4. 
 
Lemma 3-1 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, 
and the sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
 
Proposition 2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0<Ξ  if 
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Proposition 2-1 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current 
account surplus of economy 2 continue indefinitely on the multilateral path. The 
condition ( ) ( )[ ]
2
111 21 θθεαα
mν
α α
α +<−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −  is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter 
values.  
 Conversely, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
 
Corollary 3-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 0lim
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Proof: See Appendix 5. 
 
Corollary 3-1 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from 
economy 1 to economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the 
accumulated current account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the 
beginning. Before Corollary 3-1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s∫0  should be accumulated. In 
the early periods, when dsτ
t
s∫0  is small, the balance on goods and services of economy 
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t ∫∂∂− 0,2,2 ) continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of 
dsτ
t
s∫0  is accumulated, the trade balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 
3.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 Similarly, the value of Ξ in the heterogeneous risk aversion model is uniquely 
determined on the multilateral path. 
 
Lemma 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 
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Proposition 2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0<Ξ  if 
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Corollary 3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0lim
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 By Lemma 3-2 and equations (21) and (22), the limit of the growth rate on the 
multilateral path is  
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3.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 As Lemma 2-3 shows, on the multilateral path, either 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 
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τ& . On the former path, 
0=Ξ  and heterogeneous productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances. 
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However, on the latter path, trade imbalances usually grow at a higher rate than 
consumption, because usually ( ) ( ) >−⎥⎦
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latter path will generally not be selected. The question of which path is selected is 
examined in detail in the Section 4.3. 
 
3.5  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
 The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that 
heterogeneities in time preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies 
conclude that the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., 
Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003); this indicates that the economy with 
the higher productivity has a lower rate of time preference and vice versa. In this section, 
the models are extended to include heterogeneity in multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk 
aversion, and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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3.3 and 3.4. 
 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between 
θ1 and θ2, ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and 
productivity are negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 21 θθ <  and 21 ωω >  
while 21 εε = ), then by similar proofs as those presented for Proposition 2-1 and 
Corollary 3-1, if ( ) ( )[ ]
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 on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits 
and trade surpluses of economy 1 continue indefinitely. The condition 
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⎡ + −  is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter 
values.  
 
3.6  Multi-economy models 
 The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that 
have differing degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
3.6.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time 
preference. Let θi be the rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current 
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account balance of economy i with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, 
and i ≠ j. Because the total population is Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The 
representative household of economy i maximizes its expected utility  
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition 3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and 
only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at 
steady state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Appendix 6. 
 
3.6.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy 
model by a proof similar to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are 
identical except for risk aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , 
H). 
 
Proposition 3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and 
only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at 
steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
3.6.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar 
to that for Proposition 3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for 
productivity, and their productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because =+ tk ,21  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=+ 1
2
1
,2,2,1 ω
ωkkk ttt , the productivity of economy 1+2 is ( )αtααtααtt kωkωAy −−+ += 1,221,11,21  
( ) α tαtα kAωω −++= 1 ,2121 . 
 
Proposition 3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and 
only if 
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at 
steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
3.6.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
 Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in 
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multiple elements, as follows. 
 
Proposition 3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if 
and only if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies 
are satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition 3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral 
path. 
 
3.7  Degeneration to an exogenous technology model 
 The multilateral paths in the endogenous growth models imply that similar 
sustainable states exist in exogenous technology models. However, this is true only for 
the heterogeneous time preference model, because, in exogenous technology models, 
the steady state means that θ
k
y
t
t =∂
∂ ; that is, the heterogeneity in risk aversion is 
irrelevant to the steady state, and the heterogeneous productivities do not result in 
permanent trade imbalances due to 
t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1
∂
∂=∂
∂ . Thereby, only heterogeneous time 
preference is relevant to sustainable heterogeneity in exogenous growth models. 
 If technology is exogenously given and constant (At = A), Hamiltonians for the 
heterogeneous time preference model shown in Section 2.2.1 degenerate to  
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and 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+−−+−= ∫−− ,ttt sαtααtα,t,t cτdsτkAαkAλtθcuH 20,21,222222 1exp . 
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By equations (10), (11), and (12), the growth rate of consumption in economy 1 is 
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be constant at steady state, it is necessary that 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and thus 0=Ξ . Therefore, 
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If equation (38) holds, all the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely 
satisfied. This result is analogous to equation (29) and corresponds to the multilateral 
path in the endogenous growth models. The state indicated by equation (38) is called the 
“multilateral steady state” in the following discussion. 
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 If both economies are not open and are isolated, 1
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 at steady state instead of the conditions shown in equation (38). Hence, 
at the multilateral steady state with 21 θθ < , the amount of capital in economy 1 is 
smaller than when the economy is isolated and vice versa. As a result, output and 
consumption in economy 1 are also smaller in the multilateral steady state with 21 θθ <  
than when the economy is isolated. Furthermore, 
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<∫∞→ dsτt st  ; 
 
that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
( ) dsτkAα t sαtα ∫−− 0,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim =∞→ tt τ  and 0=Ξ , the 
debts do not explode but stabilize at steady state. 
 In the multilateral steady state, all the optimality conditions of both economies 
are satisfied, and heterogeneity is therefore sustainable. However, this state will be 
economically less preferable for economy 1 as compared with the state of Becker 
(1980), because consumption is smaller and debts are owed. Which state should 
economy 1 select? A similar dilemma―whether to give priority to simultaneous 
optimality with economy 2 or to unilaterally optimal higher utility―will also arise in 
the endogenous growth models; this is examined in the following sections. 
 
4.  UNILATERAL BALANCED GROWTH 
 
 The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not 
mean that the two economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) 
predicts that it is likely that, under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) 
still hold in endogenous growth models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced 
growth equilibria do not exist in a multi-agent economy in general, except in the special 
case that all agents have the same constant rate of time preference. How the economies 
behave in the environments described in Sections 2 and 3 is examined in this section. 
 
4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
 The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions 
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of economy 1 are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve 
optimality, but economy 2 cannot. 
 
Lemma 4-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets tτ  
without regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to 
satisfy all the optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Appendix 7. 
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at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that ∞=02 ,c , which violates the 
optimality condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the 
optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation 
(40) even though those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on 
which all its optimality conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path 
satisfying equation (40) is called the “unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral 
path” in the following discussion. Clearly, heterogeneity in time preference is not 
sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? 
Possibly, both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements 
may be reached. If no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following 
unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not 
regard the optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to 
economy 1) to its consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions 
of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral 
path and sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The 
first option is for economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding 
economy 1: that is, to select its own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the 
behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 
without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates, unilaterally optimal growth 
rates are different between the two economies and 
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economy 1 than in economy 2 and some of it will need to be exported to economy 2. As 
a result, 
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,1 &&&& >=> , which means that all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. Since 
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becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in that 
economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This 
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process escalates as time passes because 
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eventually almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are 
consumed by households in economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for 
economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set ∞=02 ,c  to satisfy all its 
optimality conditions, as the proof of Lemma 4-1 indicates. Setting ∞=02 ,c  is 
impossible, but economy 2 as the follower will initially set ,tc2  as large as possible. 
This action gives economy 2 a higher expected utility than that of the first option, 
because consumption in economy 2 in the second case is always higher. As a result, 
economy 2 imports as many goods and services as possible from economy 1, and the 
trade deficit of economy 2 continues until ( ) tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− 011  is achieved; this is, 
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τ&  is achieved. The current account deficits and the accumulated debts 
of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, they will increase 
more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
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) because, in general, 
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mν
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⎛− 111  ( )21 θθ << . If no disturbance occurs, the 
expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes extremely 
vulnerable to even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, 
economy 2 will lose all its capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This 
result corresponds to the state shown by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable 
for economy 2. Because ( ) 01lim
0
1 =⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−∞→ tt sα
α
t
τdsτα
mν
α , inequality (27) holds, and the 
transversality condition for economy 1 is satisfied by Lemma 1-1. Thus, all the 
optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied if economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in 
any case if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral 
behavior of economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of 
economy 2 is higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 
will choose the second option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s 
optimality conditions, the debts owed by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely 
at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
 The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma 4-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets tτ  
 34
without regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality 
conditions of both economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) 
to its consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 
are satisfied. 
 
4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
 Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, 
heterogeneity in productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma 4-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets tτ  
without regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the 
optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Appendix 8. 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
equation (31) or (32) holds, because 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
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∞→
 can be constant only when equation (31) 
or (32) holds. Equation (31) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (32) 
corresponds to the unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma 4-3 
shows that, even on the unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies 
are satisfied because the limit of both economies’ growth rates is identical on the path of 
either equation (31) or (32), such that ( )( ) ⎪⎭
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Therefore, heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. 
How does economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as 
possible before reaching the steady state at which =
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫
∫
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t
t
t
t ds
dt
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 (i.e., if it initially sets τi as 0<tτ  and 0
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t ), 
the expected utility of economy 1 will be higher than it is in either case where 0>tτ  
or in the multilateral path. However, the debts economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow 
indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the ratio of debt to consumption 
explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be sustained forever, 
but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 
although all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will 
prefer the multilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does 
not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path 
will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of 
heterogeneous productivity.  
 
5.  PATH SELECTION 
 
5.1  Political elements 
 The multilateral path will be naturally selected in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity, as shown in Section 4.3. However, in the case of heterogeneous 
preferences, the incentive for economy 1 to select the multilateral path will be weak. 
This is true even though both paths enable economy 1 to achieve optimality, because the 
growth rate of economy 1 on the multilateral path is lower than that on the unilateral 
path (although economy 1’s consumption on the unilateral path is initially smaller), and 
the expected utility of economy 1 on the multilateral path will not necessarily be larger 
than that on the unilateral path. 
 Furthermore, even though heterogeneous productivity naturally results in the 
multilateral path, heterogeneous productivity affects path selection through a different 
channel. As argued in Section 3.5, empirical studies indicate that it is highly likely that 
the rate of time preference is negatively correlated with productivity (e.g., Lawrance, 
1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). Harashima (2009b) presents a model in which 
the rate of time preference is determined endogenously by steady state consumption, 
and the rate of time preference and steady state consumption are negatively correlated. 
This probable negative correlation indicates that, even though heterogeneous 
productivity does not directly affect path selection, it will indirectly affect it through this 
correlation. 
 When economy 1 selects the unilateral path, does economy 2 quietly accept the 
unfavorable consequences discussed in Section 4? From an economic perspective, the 
optimal response of economy 2 is the one shown in Remarks 1-1 and 1-2: economy 2 
should behave as a follower and accept the unfavorable consequences. However, if 
other factors—particularly political ones—are taken into account, the response of 
economy 2 will be different. Faced with a situation in which all the optimality 
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conditions cannot be satisfied, it is highly likely that economy 2 would politically 
protest and resist economy 1. It should be emphasized economy 2 is not responsible for 
its own non-optimality, which is a result of economy 1’s unilateral behavior in a 
heterogeneous population. Economy 2 may overlook the non-optimality if it is 
temporary, but it will not if it is permanent. Because Lemmas 4-1 and 4-2 and Remarks 
1-1 and 1-2 indicate that the non-optimality is permanent, it is quite likely that economy 
2 will seriously resist economy 1 politically.  
 If economy 1 could achieve its optimality only on the unilateral path, economy 
1 would counter the resistance of economy 2, but this is not the case. Because of this, 
economy 2’s demand does not necessarily appear to be unreasonable or selfish. Faced 
with the protest and resistance by economy 2, economy 1 may compromise or cooperate 
with economy 2 and select the multilateral path. 
 
5.2  Resistance 
 The main objective of economy 2 is to force economy 1 to select the 
multilateral path and to establish sustainable heterogeneity. This objective may be 
achieved through cooperative measures, non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., trade 
restrictions), or other more violent means. 
Restricting or abolishing trade between the two economies will cost economy 1 
because it necessitates a restructuring of the division of labor, and the restructuring will 
not be confined to a small scale. Large-scale adjustments will develop that involve all 
levels of divided labor, because they are all correlated with each other. For example, if 
an important industry had previously existed only in one economy, owing to a division 
of labor, and trade between the two economies was no longer permitted, the other 
economy would have to establish this industry while also maintaining other industries. 
As a result, economy 1 would incur non-negligible costs. More developed economies 
have more complicated and sophisticated divisions of labor, and restructuring costs 
from the disruption of trade will be much higher in developed economies. In addition, 
more resources will need to be allocated to the generation of technology because 
technology will also no longer be traded. Finally, all of the conventional benefits of 
trade will be lost. Trade is beneficial because of the heterogeneous endowment of 
resources, as the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem shows. Because goods and services are 
assumed to be uniform in the models presented in this paper, the benefits of trade are 
implicit in the models. However, in the real word, resources such as oil and other raw 
materials are unevenly distributed, so a disruption or restriction of trade will 
substantially damage economic activities on both national and international levels. 
 The damage done by trade restrictions has an upper limit, however, because the 
restructuring of the division of labor, additional resource allocation to innovation, and 
loss of trade benefits are all finite. Therefore, in some cases, particularly if economies 
are not sufficiently developed and division of labor is not complex, the damage caused 
will be relatively small. Hence, a disruption of trade (non-violent civil disobedience in 
the national models) may not be sufficiently effective as a means of resistance under 
some these conditions.  
In some cases, harassment, sabotage, intimidation, and violence may be used, 
whether legal or illegal. In extreme cases, war or revolution could ensue. In such cases, 
economy 1 will be substantially damaged in many ways and be unable to achieve 
optimality. The resistance and resulting damages will continue until sustainability is 
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established. 
 In any case, the objective of economy 2’s resistance conversely implies that 
establishing sustainability eliminates the risk and cost of political and social instability. 
The resistance of economy 2 will lower the desire of economy 1 to select the unilateral 
path. 
 
5.3  The path selection model 
 The arguments in Section 5.2 imply that the path selection of economy 1 needs 
to be made fully considering the possibility of resistance by economy 2. Economy 1 will 
act to minimize the loss caused by the resistance minus the utility gain attributed to 
taking unilateral action. The political loss function of the representative household of 
economy 1 is 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫∞ −−−−= 0 111exp dthccGDGpγtθΓ t,M,t,U,ttt  , 
 
where ( )•γ  is the instantaneous political loss function of economy 1 (γ′> 0 and γ′′< 0); 
U,tc ,1  and M,tc ,1  are the levels of consumption for economy 1 on the unilateral and 
multilateral paths, respectively; ( )10 ≤≤ pp  is the probability of the occurrence of 
resistance by economy 2; D (≥ 0) is the damage done to economy 1 by the resistance of 
economy 2; Gt (≥ 0) indicates the gap between the multilateral path and the current path; 
and ht is the stream of economy 1’s consumption adjustments to reduce p. ( ) ( )tt GDGp  represents the loss and ,M,t,U,t cc 11 −  represents the gain from taking 
unilateral actions. The loss and gain are evaluated by the instantaneous political loss 
function γ additively discounted indefinitely by θ1 from the present to the future, 
balanced with the control variable ht. 
 D indicates the sum of the economic values of various types of damage (e.g., 
physical, mental, and financial losses), opportunity costs, and similar items. In addition, 
( ) ( ) ,U,ttt cδGD 1ϕ= , ( ) 0>
t
t
d
dδ
ϕ
ϕ , and ( ) 00 =δ , where 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ  and M,tc ,2  is 
economy 2’s consumption on the multilateral path. That is, as economy 2 perceives that 
the magnitude of the gap (
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ ) increases, economy 2 intensifies its resistance, 
and as the scale of economy 1’s consumption ,U,tc1  increases, the scale of economy 1’s 
damage increases. The gap is defined as tMtt ggG ,−= , where ∫= t st dsg 0τ  (i.e., 
economy 1’s accumulated lending to economy 2), and tMg ,  is gt on the multilateral 
path. As Remarks 1-1 and 1-2 indicate, if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the ratio of 
economy 2’s debts owed to economy 1 ( ∫−=− t st dsg 0τ ) to its consumption explodes to 
infinity. Thus, Gt reflects the distance from the multilateral path. Like the damage 
( )tδ ϕ , the probability of the occurrence of resistance p is a function of 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ : 
( )tp ϕ , for example, ( ) Πtp −+−= 11 ϕ , where ( )0>Π  is a constant. In addition, 
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( ) 0>∂
∂
t
tp
ϕ
ϕ , ( ) 00 =p , and ( ) 1=∞p . Finally, the adjustment ht is the tool of 
economy 1 to control p and bring the consumption stream of economy 1 closer to that 
on the multilateral path; thus, ∫= t st dsg 0τ  and Gt decrease, as does p, because 
( ) 0>∂
∂
t
tp
ϕ
ϕ . The adjustment ht indicates the behavior of economy 1 such that, by 
consuming more goods and services by ht, capital and technology are not accumulated 
as quickly as on the unilateral path, and economy 1’s lending ( ∫= t st dsg 0τ )—the 
reverse of which is economy 2’s debts ( ∫−=− t st dsg 0τ )—increases less rapidly. The 
adjustment ht eventually becomes positive (i.e., 0lim >∞→ tt h ), but it has an upper 
boundary such that 1lim
11
≤−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h . The fully adjusted path ( 1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h ) 
equals the multilateral path. If economy 1 wishes to lower p, ht is increased. 
Accordingly, 0lim ≤
∞→
t
t
t dh
dG  and 0→tG  as 1
11
→− ,M,t,U,t
t
cc
h . 
 The nature of ht shown above indicates that the gap tMtt ggG ,−=  is a 
monotonously continuous function of ht; thus, ( )[ ] ( )ttt hphGp =  and ( )[ ] =tt hGδ  
( )thδ . Particularly, these functions are specified here as  
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As is true with 
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ , ht is standardized by M,tc ,2  because economy 2 initiates and 
increases the level of resistance based on information on the magnitude of the adjusted 
deviation from M,tc ,2  (i.e., 
,M,t
t
c
h
2
) through perceiving the gap (
,M,t
t
t c
G
2
=ϕ ). In 
addition, because 0lim ≤
∞→
t
t
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dG  and 0→tG  as 1
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→− ,M,t,U,t
t
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h , then the two 
functions (equations [41] and [42]) have the following properties: 
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and 
 
( ) 0lim
2
=∞→ ,tct ,M,thp  and ( ) 0lim 2 =∞→ ,tct ,M,thδ  ⇔  1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h  .     (44) 
 
Property (44) reflects the criterion for putting up resistance―whether sustainable 
heterogeneity is established or not. If it is established, no resistance occurs, but if it is 
not established or broken, resistance occurs. The rationale for this criterion is that 
without sustainability all the optimality conditions of economy 2 are not satisfied. 
 Putting together all of the above elements, the model of path selection is 
constructed as follows. The representative household of economy 1 minimizes expected 
net political loss 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∫ ∞ −−−−= 0 1111 22exp dthccchδhpγtθEΓE t,M,t,U,t,U,t,tc,tc ,M,t,M,t  . 
 
 Note that the political loss function is completely different from the social 
welfare function. The political loss function does not indicate a social ranking of states 
but rather the preference ranking of each individual evaluated on the basis of the 
criterion of sustainability, because sustainability is evaluated not by society but by each 
individual household. Whether the multilateral path is optimal for the society or not, the 
path selection is made through each individual’s optimization on the basis of the 
political loss function.  
 
5.4  The optimal path selection for economy 1 
 The optimality condition for the minimization problem of economy 1 is 
0=
tdh
dΓ  for any t; that is, economy 1 should set ht to satisfy 
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for any t. The stream of ht depends on the functional forms of ( ),tc ,M,thp 2  and ( ),tc ,M,thδ 2 . Nevertheless, by equation (45), 
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because U,tc ,1  grows more rapidly than ,M,tc 2 , and the path of economy 1 converges 
to the multilateral path as Proposition 4 shows. 
 
Proposition 4: On the path that satisfies the optimality condition (equation [45]), 
1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h . 
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Proof: Because of equation (46) and property (43), ( )=∞→ ,tct ,M,thp 2lim  ( ) 0lim 2 =∞→ ,tct ,M,thδ  
on the path that satisfies equation (45). Therefore, by property (44), 
1lim
11
=−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h .                                                   ■ 
 
Proposition 4 indicates that, because of the non-zero probability of political conflicts, 
the path of economy 1 eventually must equal the multilateral path; this means that 
sustainable heterogeneity is naturally established in any case. In modern industrialized 
countries that have large middle class populations, the state Becker (1980) indicates has 
not been observed; this implies that the multilateral path has been actually selected in 
those countries. 
 However, Proposition 4 depends on properties (43) and (44), so even a very 
small deviation of economy 1 from sustainable heterogeneity generates resistance. If 
properties (43) and (44) are replaced such that ( ) 0
2
=,tc ,M,thp , ( ) 02 =,tc ,M,thδ , ( )
0
2
2 =
,tc
,tc
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hdp , and ( ) 0
2
2 =
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,M,t
dh
hdδ  even if 1lim
11
<−∞→ ,M,t,U,t
t
t cc
h , then the multilateral path 
is not necessarily naturally selected. For example, suppose that ( ) 0
2
=,tc ,M,thp  and ( )
0
2
2 =
,tc
,tc
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hdp  if p,t,c,tc ,M,t,M,t hh 22 ≥ , and 
( )
0
2
2 =
,tc
,tc
,M,t
,M,t
dh
hdδ  if ,t, δc,tc ,M,t,M,t hh 22 ≤ , where 
p,t,c ,M,t
h
2
 and ,t, δc ,M,th 2  are constants and ,t, δcp,t,c ,M,t,M,t hh 22 < . That is, even if the path is 
not adjusted fully such that p,t,c,tc ,M,t,M,t hh 22 ≥ , economy 2 tolerates non-optimality and 
does not attempt any resistance. In addition, the effect of economy 2’s resistance has an 
upper boundary ( ),t, δc ,M,thδ 2  because the political power of economy 2 is weak and/or 
economy 1 can politically constrain the resistance. With these properties, economy 1 
can satisfy equation (46) by setting ht at p,t,c ,M,th 2  even if it behaves unilaterally. This 
example implies that the conditions for the multilateral path do not necessarily have to 
be selected. 
 
Remark 2: The multilateral balanced growth path will not necessarily be selected by 
economy 1 if economy 2 hesitates to resist the unilateral behavior of economy 1, if 
economy 2’s political power to resist is limited, or if economy 1 can politically 
constrain economy 2’s resistance.  
 
6.  ESTABLISHING SUSTAINABLE 
HETEROGENEITY 
 
 As Section 5.2 shows, less advantaged economies will pursue the establishment 
of the multilateral path. In addition, even though minimization of the political loss 
function does not require the presumption that sustainable heterogeneity is optimal for 
society, sustainability implies a normative ingredient. This is because it seems likely 
that many people will agree that the state in which all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous people are indefinitely satisfied is socially preferable for the fundamental 
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good of society. If a society regards sustainable heterogeneity as such, it has to endeavor 
to establish and maintain sustainability. 
 
6.1 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity 
 For a variety of reasons, establishing and maintaining sustainable heterogeneity 
are not necessarily easy tasks. A problem is the lack of a market in which “index 
futures” of the resistance are exchanged. Without a market, information on the 
probability p and the damage δ is not sufficiently transmitted and is imperfect to 
economy 1. As a result of the imperfect information, p and δ are evaluated differently in 
economies 1 and 2, and economy 1 will incorrectly expect economy 2’s actions and 
may mistakenly act unilaterally. Furthermore, information obtained by economy 2 on 
economy 1’s behavior becomes biased, because economy 1’s evaluations of p and δ are 
biased as a result of the imperfect information. Because of the lack of a market and the 
resulting imperfect nature of the information, economy 2 may resist seriously even 
though economy 1 actually selects the multilateral path. In the sense that markets cannot 
solve this problem, this fragility can be regarded as a kind of market failure. To secure 
sustainable heterogeneity, therefore, some artificial mechanisms will be required. 
 In addition, Remark 2 indicates that economy 2’s hesitation to resist and lack of 
political power to resist, and economy 1’s political power to constrain the resistance, 
may mean that the multilateral path will not always be selected. A reason for the 
hesitation is that the resistance also hurts economy 2. In some cases, the resistance may 
harm economy 2 more than economy 1. Taking this risk into account, economy 2 may 
hesitate to resist if the deviation of economy 1 from sustainable heterogeneity is 
relatively small. In this paper, the political loss function of economy 2 is not explicitly 
modeled for simplicity, but it is represented by ( )tc M,thp ,,2  and ( ),tc ,M,thδ 2  in the 
political loss function of economy 1. Actually, however, not only tc M,th ,,2  and tc M,th ,,2 , 
but also various other political and social factors, will affect p and δ. Under some 
political and social circumstances (e.g., living in a totalitarian state), resistance may 
instead totally damage economy 2; therefore, for practical reasons, economy 2 may not 
be able to resist. In democratic societies, the costs of resistance for economy 2 will be 
substantially lower than that in non-democratic societies. However, in any case, 
economy 2 will have many minor political and social frictions or rigidities. For example, 
all present democratic countries have adopted indirect democracy; minority voices are 
often neglected, and sometimes even majority voices are neglected during the period 
between elections. In these cases, people cannot resist through voting. In addition, there 
may be psychological barriers in small rural communities. If there are such political and 
social frictions, they may have to be removed, for example, through the intervention of 
social welfare authorities. 
 
6.2  United economies 
 An important countermeasure to the fragility of sustainable heterogeneity for 
less advantaged economies is the formation of a union of economies. If economies other 
than economy 1 are united by commonly selecting the multilateral path within them, 
their power to resist economy 1 will be substantially enhanced. Consider the 
multi-economy model shown in Section 3.6.4. If the economies do not form a union, the 
power to resist the unilateral actions of economy 1 is divided and limited to the power 
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of each individual economy. However, if the economies are united, the power to resist 
economy 1 increases. If a sufficient number of economies unite, the multilateral path 
will almost certainly be selected by economy 1. 
 To maintain the union, any economy in the union should have the explicit and 
resolved intention of selecting the multilateral path within the union, even if it is 
relatively more advantaged within the union. To demand that relatively more 
advantaged economies select the multilateral path, less advantaged economies 
themselves must also select the multilateral path in any case. Otherwise, less advantaged 
economies will be divided and ruled by more advantaged economies. For all 
heterogeneous people to happily coexist, all of them should behave multilaterally. At 
the same time, Section 3.6 indicates that the more advantaged an economy is, the more 
modestly it should behave, i.e., the more it should restrain itself from accumulating 
extra capitals. 
 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity will also be mitigated by the 
formation of an economic union. With the union, economy 1 will be able to obtain more 
perfect information on p and δ, because the behavior of the united economies will be 
more visible and recognizable to economy 1 than the dispersed behaviors of many small 
economies.  
 Note that economy 1 may also unite with economies that have similar 
preferences to counter the increased political power of the united economies that have 
different preferences. As a result, economies will converge to two united economies, 
and there will be a political struggle over sustainability. This struggle may be viewed as 
a “class struggle,” for example, between labor and capital or between developing and 
developed countries. 
 
6.3  Interventions for social welfare 
 The fragility of sustainable heterogeneity will not be completely eliminated 
only by the formation of economic unions, because the power to resist economy 1 may 
not be increased sufficiently by forming a union, and because the fragility is caused not 
only by weak resistance but also by imperfect information. To correct the problem of 
imperfect information and secure sustainability, intervention by the authority is justified. 
Sorger (2002) shows that, if the authority levies a progressive income tax or if there are 
few households of each type and thus they are not simple price takers but play a Nash 
equilibrium, the results shown by Becker (1980) do not hold. Ghiglino (2002) argues 
that the latter case of Sorger (2002) can be interpreted as a model of international trade 
with a common market simply by associating each household’s type to an economy 
with a national central planner or a representative household. 
 
6.3.1  Taxes and transfers 
 The problem of imperfect information can be partly corrected if the authority 
substitutes for households in the allocation of resources. As shown in Section 4, more 
capital is accumulated when economy 1 selects the unilateral path than the multilateral 
path. If taxes are levied on the incomes or directly on the extra accumulated capital in 
economy 1, the allocation of resources will change and the extra accumulated capital 
will be reduced. With the forced capital reduction, the benefits of acting unilaterally are 
diminished, and economy 1 will be less willing to select the unilateral path. The use of 
taxes therefore can mitigate the problem of imperfect information and secure the 
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selection of the multilateral path. Moreover, if tax revenues from economy 1 are 
transferred to economy 2, economy 2 can reduce ∫= t st dsg 0τ  and tMtt ggG ,−= . 
Hence, the effect of intervention by the authority to mitigate the imperfection of 
information is almost doubled.  
 There is, however, a practical problem in levying such taxes. The taxes require 
identification of the households that belong to economy 1. Such identification is not a 
problem in international models, but it is in national models because households of 
various economies are mixed and can be difficult to distinguish. However, if 
productivity is heterogeneous, the economy to which a household belongs will be easily 
discerned by differences in income. In addition, because productivity is probably 
negatively correlated with the rate of time preference (as argued in Section 3.5), 
households with different rates of time preference will also be distinguished by income 
differences. Therefore, if income taxes are progressive, they can be selectively levied 
more heavily on the incomes of economy 1, even in national models. Inheritance taxes 
are also effective for this purpose. 
 
6.3.2  Affirmative actions 
 Unlike taxes and transfers, the aim of affirmative actions is to to directly alter 
the attributes of economies. If production opportunities in economy 1 are constrained 
and those in economy 2 are enhanced by the authority’s interventions, productivity in 
economy 1 decreases and that in economy 2 increases. Suppose that there is 
heterogeneity in productivity between the two economies and productivity negatively 
correlates with the rate of time preference and also that, by affirmative actions, ω1, ω2, 
θ1, and θ2 are changed to be ( )11~ ωω < , ( )22~ ωω > , ( )11~ θθ > , and ( )22~ θθ < . By equation (36), 
the growth rate of economy 1 on the unilateral path is 
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+ , particularly if 2121 ~~ ωωωω +>+ , then the 
growth rate of the unilateral path decreases, which means that the benefits of and the 
incentive for selecting the unilateral path for economy 1 are reduced. As a result, the 
probabilities of selecting the unilateral path and the degree of imperfection of 
information are lowered. In addition, this action will signal the authority’s strong 
determination to pursue the multilateral path. 
 However, the affirmative action shown above will generally cause overall 
productivity to decline such that 2121 ~~ ωωωω +>+ . Hence, by equation (36), the growth 
rate of the multilateral path is also lowered. In this sense, affirmative action may be 
more controversial than taxes and transfers as the means of securing sustainable 
heterogeneity. 
 
6.4  Voluntary donations 
 Voluntary donations from economy 1 to economy 2 will also be effective in 
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mitigating the fragility. The amount of capital increases more rapidly on the unilateral 
path than on the multilateral path in economy 1, and voluntary donations indicate that 
economy 1 has explicitly abandoned a part of this extra capital accumulation instead of 
implicitly reducing it by increasing consumption. This explicit action signals that 
economy 1 is selecting the multilateral path. With this signal, information becomes less 
imperfect and sustainable heterogeneity will be more firmly secured. Voluntary 
donations are often supposed to have their root in altruism, which has been rationalized 
in various ways (e.g., Becker, 1977; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). The models in this 
paper provide an alternative rationale for altruism—voluntary donations are rational 
because they mitigate fragility and secure sustainable heterogeneity. 
 In international models, voluntary donations correspond to international aid to 
and debt relief for developing countries. If these actions are taken by an international 
organization (e.g., the United Nations, the World Bank, or the International Monetary 
Fund), they can be interpreted as the authority’s intervention for the welfare of the 
international society. 
 
6.5  Inequality 
6.5.1  Inevitable inequality for sustainable heterogeneity 
 Sustainable heterogeneity, on the other hand, is inevitably accompanied by 
inequality in consumption, particularly if productivity is heterogeneous. As Section 3 
shows, this inequality is justified from the point of view of sustainability. There is a 
unique “optimal” degree of inequality. The upper boundary of the authority’s 
interventions is the state at which sustainability is secured across heterogeneous 
households, not the state at which an even income or wealth distribution occurs. 
Interventions that help economy 2 become more advantaged than it is on the multilateral 
path are harmful for sustainability. The authority’s intervention should not eliminate 
inequality, or optimality will not be achieved and the problem of moral hazard will be 
exacerbated. Too much equality, therefore, is as unfavorable as too much inequality for 
maintaining sustainability. 
 However, inequality in consumption does not necessarily mean that less 
advantaged households are unhappy because, even with the inequality, all the optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. Even though they 
are less advantaged, people can continue to live normally without behaving counter to 
their own preferences and will not be dominated by more advantaged people. Hence, 
they may feel sufficiently happy even though their consumption is relatively small. 
Sustainable heterogeneity therefore will accomplish equality in “happiness” in the sense 
that all the heterogeneous people equally achieve optimality. 
 
6.5.2  Inequality and growth 
 Consumption inequality emerges particularly when productivity is 
heterogeneous. At the same time, productivity is most likely negatively correlated with 
the rate of time preference. Hence, in this section, inequality is examined for the case 
where 21 ωω >  and 21 θθ < . As shown in Section 3.5, on the multilateral path, the levels 
of consumption in economies 1 and 2 grow at the same rate, but consumption is higher 
in economy 1 because 21 ωω > . Nevertheless, the trade surpluses of economy 1 continue 
permanently, and the goods and services produced in economy 1 are partly consumed in 
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economy 2 because 21 θθ < . Inequality is mitigated by this trade imbalance between the 
two economies. On the unilateral path, on the other hand, the growth rate is higher than 
that of the multilateral path, and consumption of economy 1 is higher than that in 
economy 2. Because the debts economy 2 owes to economy 1 increase to infinity 
(because 21 θθ < ), all capital in economy 2 will be taken by economy 1 if even a very 
tiny negative disturbance occurs. The multilateral path appears to result in a lower rate 
of growth but also shows a lower degree of inequality than the unilateral path. This 
result implies that inequality and growth are positively correlated. 
 However, the correlation is not simple. The growth rate on the multilateral path 
is  
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by equation (36), and it is determined by the absolute values of 21 ωω +  and 
21
2211
ωω
ωθωθ
+
+ . Conversely, the degree of inequality is determined by the relative 
differences between ω1 and ω2 and θ1 and θ2. The correlations between the absolute 
values and the relative differences are intrinsically unclear, and the correlation between 
inequality and growth is also basically unclear. As discussed in the Introduction, 
empirical results about this correlation have been inconclusive (e.g., Alesina und Rodrik, 
1994; Persson und Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Forbes, 
2000; Barro, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005); this may be attributed to this intrinsic 
unclearness. 
 Nevertheless, if there is a tendency such that the relative differences between 
ω1 and ω2 and θ1 and θ2 are relatively small in a country with a relatively high absolute 
value of 21 ωω +  and lower absolute value of 
21
2211
ωω
ωθωθ
+
+ , a negative correlation 
between inequality and growth will be observed in cross-sectional data of a pool of a 
large number of countries that include both industrialized and developing countries. 
That is, if households in industrialized countries are more homogeneous and productive 
than those in developing countries, inequality in industrialized countries is relatively 
low and at the same time industrialized countries can grow more rapidly. The negative 
correlation is reported empirically by, for example, Persson and Tabellini (1994), 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), and Deininger and Squire (1998). However, 
to complete the explanation, the reason why households with relatively high 
productivities are more homogeneous has to be shown. One possible reason is that the 
values of ω1 and ω2 have upper boundaries, and their distributions among economies 
are not normal. 
 On the other hand, the models in this paper predict that positive correlations 
between inequality and growth will be observed in time-series data focusing on subsets 
of countries—particularly industrialized countries. If economic deregulations indicate 
that the unilateral path is partly allowed by the authority to achieve a higher rate of 
growth, deregulation will increase both inequality and growth. In recent decades, many 
industrialized countries have continued to deregulate their economies. Hence, positive 
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correlations may be observed if recent time-series data in industrial countries are used. 
Such correlations have been reported by Forbes (2000), Barro (2000), and Voitchovsky 
(2005). 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 This paper studies social welfare in a heterogeneous population under the 
criteria of efficiency and sustainability. Becker (1980) showed that, if time preference is 
heterogeneous, the most patient household eventually will own all capital and 
substantial inequality emerges. Although this state is Pareto efficient, less patient 
households cannot achieve optimality. The endogenous growth models in this paper 
indicate that a multilateral balanced growth path exists on which all the optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied, and that 
heterogeneity is sustainable on this path. However, sustainable heterogeneity is socially 
fragile and is not necessarily naturally obtained, because a unilateral balanced growth 
path also exists that is not sustainable and causes political conflicts. An advantaged 
economy can achieve optimality on both the unilateral and multilateral paths, whereas 
less advantaged economies can only do so on the multilateral path. In this paper, path 
selection is modeled using a political loss function. If less advantaged economies unite 
and the authority utilizes various measures such as progressive taxes, financial transfers, 
and affirmative actions, the multilateral path is secured. Voluntary donations are also 
effective in this regard.  
 The existence of a unique multilaterally balanced growth path is essential for 
sustainable heterogeneity. The importance of the existence of such a path has not 
previously been examined, because most studies on social welfare have not focused on 
heterogeneities in preferences and productivity, but further study of this path should 
shed new light on problems in the field of social welfare. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity has several important implications. The state where 
all the optimality conditions of all households are indefinitely satisfied cannot be 
achieved in a heterogeneous population relying only on markets. As Sections 5 and 6 
indicate, political aspects should be fully considered in addition to markets, and the 
authority needs to intervene in the economy to achieve sustainability. Recently, 
criticisms of so-called “market fundamentalism” have been rampant, particularly after 
the financial crisis that began in 2008 (e.g., Gray, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002, 2009; Soros, 
2008). Many of these criticisms are journalistic and emotional and lack theoretical 
foundations, but sustainable heterogeneity implies that the spirit of the criticisms can be 
supported in a heterogeneous population if market fundamentalism is the doctrine 
endorsing the unilateral path. Less advantaged economies are not responsible for their 
non-optimality on the unilateral path. The non-optimality is caused because the 
advantaged economy behaves unilaterally in a heterogeneous population. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity also provides a rationale for the behaviors such as 
sacrifice and altruism. Selecting the multilateral path may economically represent a 
sacrifice of one’s own interests and even a benefit to hostile people, because households 
in the advantaged economy accept a lower growth rate for the welfare of those in less 
advantaged economies. This behavior, however, is beneficial not only to the less 
advantaged economies economically but also to the more advantaged economies 
politically. In this sense, the altruistic behavior is rational (see e.g., Trivers, 1971; 
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Becker, 1977; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Nowak, 2006). The multilateral path achieved 
by rational sacrifice and altruism minimizes the probability of political conflicts and 
leads to a politically and economically harmonized society in which all of the optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are indefinitely satisfied. 
 Sustainable heterogeneity also has important implications for globalization. 
Globalization has been viewed favorably from the economic point of view, but it has 
been controversial from some political points of view. Particularly, its impacts on 
inequality have been debated intensely (e.g., Klein, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). The models in 
this paper imply that, if there is no heterogeneity, globalization will be basically 
favorable. If there is heterogeneity, however, this will not necessarily be true. Unless 
sustainable heterogeneity is achieved and maintained, political protest and resistance 
will arise. The enhancement of globalization therefore should be consistent with 
sustainable heterogeneity. All economies should behave multilaterally, and measures to 
mitigate the fragility of sustainability (e.g., giving aid to and debt relief for developing 
countries) should be taken. 
 Inequality in consumption is necessary for sustainability, and there is a unique 
sustainable level of inequality. Therefore, the authority’s interventions should work 
towards achieving sustainability across heterogeneous households, not ensuring even 
income and wealth distributions. If the interventions go too far, optimality will not be 
achieved and the problem of moral hazard will be exacerbated. However, although 
consumption is relatively small for less advantaged people, they are not necessarily 
unhappy, because all of their optimality conditions are indefinitely satisfied. They can 
continue to live normally without behaving counter to their preferences, and they will 
not be dominated by more advantaged people. 
 The concept of sustainable heterogeneity may be used as a supplement to the 
concept of GDP as a measure of social welfare, because welfare can be evaluated by 
both efficiency and sustainability. The use of GDP as a measure of social welfare has 
been criticized for not sufficiently reflecting people’s happiness (e.g., Sen, 1976; Arrow 
et al., 1995). Indeed, if the unilateral path is selected, efficiency improves more rapidly 
and GDP will grow faster than when the multilateral path is selected, but less 
advantaged economies cannot achieve optimality. In this situation, many people will be 
unhappy even though the GDP per capita is higher. If GDP is modified for measures of 
sustainable heterogeneity or a new measurement that combines GDP and sustainable 
heterogeneity is constructed, it may be possible to more correctly measure the 
magnitude of people’s happiness in a heterogeneous population. 
 Heterogeneous productivity almost certainly is an important cause of many 
phenomena regarding economic inequality (e.g., Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones, 1999). 
In addition, heterogeneous productivity is highly likely to be negatively correlated with 
a heterogeneous rate of time preference. Hence, the concept of rational sacrifice and 
altruism, which is useful for the problems caused by heterogeneous productivity and 
time preference, will be applicable to a wide range of problems that arise owing to 
economic inequality. Moreover, because many political conflicts have their roots in 
economic problems, this concept and the criterion of sustainability may also provide 
clues to the resolution of many such conflicts. 
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2  Proof of Lemma 2-1 
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3  Proof of Corollary 1-1  
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4  Proof of Lemma 3-1 
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5  Proof of Corollary 3-1 
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6  Proof of Proposition 3-1  
(Step 1) Suppose first that H is 3. Among the three economies, economies 1 and 2 are 
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economy be economy 1+2. Because economies 1+2 and 3 are fully open to each other, 
returns on investments in both economies are kept equal through arbitration such that  
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Because equation (A1) is always held through arbitration, equations tt kk ,3,21 =+ , 
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 Applying the same procedures as the case of economies 1+2 and 3 to the case 
of economies 1+2+3 and 4 when H = 4, similar properties can be shown to hold 
between economies 1+2+3 and 4. Iterating the same procedures, similar properties can 
be shown to hold for economy 1+2+…+H.                                  ■ 
 
7  Proof of Lemma 4-1  
When tτ  is set independently by each economy, tτ  is a control variable in addition to 
ct for each economy. Hence, the optimality condition  
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is commonly added to the optimality conditions of each economy. Here, by Proposition 
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which is shown in Proposition 1-1.                                        ■ 
 
8  Proof of Lemma 4-3  
In this case, tτ  can be seen as a control variable for each economy. Hence, the 
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optimality conditions of each of the two economies, and 
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 By Lemma 2-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, 
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